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MAY-JUNE, 1962
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONTRACTS
By PAUL F. GOLDSMITH*
In reviewing the 1961 cases on the subject of contracts, some
cases have been here included that might also be included in a re-
view of torts. These cases deal with fraud in the inducement of the
contract. They are included as bearing upon the measure of dam-
ages where the injured party has affirmed the contract and sued
for damages based on loss of bargain. The cases have been reviewed
under subject headings which, it is hoped, will prove useful as a
guide.
I. CONTRACT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
The case of Rupp v. Cool1 is particularly important to practic-
ing lawyers. It is a reminder that while the attorney and prospec-
tive client may contract, without limit, with respect to the fees to
be paid to the attorney if such contract is entered into before the
attorney-client relationship exists, once the relationship does exist
the attorney must prove not only the contract, and its performance,
but also that the contract was fair and reasonable under all of the
circumstances and that the services to be rendered were reasonably
worth the amount charged. The court held it error for the trial
court to refuse the plaintiff attorney permission to amend his com-
plaint to set up a separate claim based upon quantum meruit re-
garding services rendered. Apparently the case was reversed for
other reasons.
2
II. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE: PARTIES To CONTRACT;
REFORMATION OF CONTRACT
Dismissal of an employment agency's complaint for recovery of
a fee for finding Perkins a job was affirmed in Wilson v. Perkins.3
Perkins had applied for a "sales" job and was placed by the agency.
After two weeks, the employer required that Perkins take one year
of paid training in the employer's shop to learn how to dismantle,
repair and assemble machinery and equipment sold by the employ-
er. Perkins immediately notified the employer and the agency of
his resignation. There was no meeting of the minds between Per-
kins and the employer because Perkins thought he was to be a
salesman, and the employer was apparently seeking someone who
might be trained as a mechanic. Because the proposed offer of em-
ployment had been promptly rejected by Perkins upen learning of
the true nature of the job, the agency was not entitled to the em-
ployment fee.
4
The trial court's holding that an insured, who was an adjudicat-
ed mental incompetent, lacked the necessary capacity to change
*Member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Ass'ns, member of the Denver firm of Sears & Gold-smith and Instructor in Law, University of Denver College of Low.
1 362 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1961).
2 The client lost, in the original action for damages on an account stated, in a trial to thecounty court. Upon an appeal to the district court the client requested the jury trial and the districtcourt refused to grant the same. This is apparently a case of first impression in Colorado andconstrues Colo. Rev. Stat. 37-6-13 (1953) and Colo. R. Civ. P. 38, holding that either party on appealfrom the county court to the district court is entitled to a jury trial in the district court upon demand.
3 363 P.2d 492 (Colo. 1961).
4 The contract between Wilson and Perkins provided that Perkins would pay one-half of onemonth's salary as an employment fee if Perkins accepted an offered job, and that he would either
promptly accept or reject any job offered.
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beneficiary under a benefit certificate was affirmed in Crain v.
Electrical Workers' Benefit Ass'n.5 Crain sought to collect under
the certificate by virtue of a change in beneficiary which was re-
ceived and filed by the association three days after the insured had
been adjudicated a mental incompetent in Denver County Court
on a petition initiated by Crain.
The judgment in favor of an architect for a fee based upon ten
percent of the cost of construction was affirmed in Kovacheff v.
Langhart.6 Plaintiffs sought (1) to reverse this judgment on the
ground that they could not read the contract, (2) to recover an in-
stallment payment made to the architect, and (3) to rescind the
contract alleging the proposed structure was not to cost more than
$110,000 but that the estimated cost, based on bids on the drawings
and specifications was $150,000. The contract employing the archi-
tect was silent on the cost of the structure except to state that the
architect did not guarantee preliminary estimates of cost. The court
refused to relieve plaintiffs on their obligations under the contract
following the well settled rule that, in the absence of fraud, a party
cannot escape contractual obligations simply because the party can-
not read the contract and does not know of its contents.
In an appropriate instance, the apparent party to a contract
may be disregarded where it appears that a person is acting in his
own behalf and not on the behalf of the apparent contracting party.
Such a case is Crowley v. Green.7 Plaintiff sued for the purchase
price of two hydraulic lifts which were sold by his assignor to a
corporation of which Green was a director, officer and stockholder.
At the time of the purported sale, the corporation was in dire finan-
cial difficulties, had no use for the lifts, and was not in the business
of selling such items. These facts were not disclosed to the vendor.
Green immediately appropriated the lifts to his own use, and short-
ly thereafter made a book entry upon the corporation's records ap-
plying the value of the lifts against the corporate debt due Green.
In reversing judgment for Green, the court approved the plaintiff's
contention that Green was acting in his own behalf in the purchase,
and that the corporation was only a conduit to pass the merchan-
dise from the vendor to Green. A contrary holding would have pre-
ferred Green, the officer and director of the insolvent corporation,
and permitted a diversion of corporate assets to discharge a cor-
porate obligation to an officer and director to the detriment of the
other creditors.
In Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins.
Co.," American Founders sought to recover judgment for monies
paid Colorado Management under a contract. The contract was
adopted by the directors of American Founders at a meeting attend-
ed by six of its eight directors. Three of those attending held offices
in both companies. Five were needed to form a quorum under the
by-laws. Plaintiff now contends the contracts were unauthorized
and voidable. Defendant contends that the contracts were later rati-
fied at a meeting of the full board of directors. In general, judg-
ment was affirmed for American Founders though modified in
5361 P.2d 442 (Colo. 1961).
8 363 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1961).
7365 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1961).
8359 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1961).
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amount. Thus, it was held that where two corporations have con-
tracted with each other, the contract is 'Voidable if unfair to the cor-
poration attempting to avoid the same, and if necessary to count the
directors common to both corporations in order to determine the
existence of a quorum of the directors of the objecting corporation.
It is the personal interest of the common directors that demands
this result. A later ratification of the minutes of the directors' meet-
ing by the full board, and even by the stockholders of the corpora-
tions, was held to be equivalent to no more than an acknowledg-
ment of the correctness of the secretary's report of the meeting and
did not constitute a ratification of the invalid contract.
In Sago v. Ashford,9 judgment against Sago for the balance due
on the purchase of goods was affirmed. Sago signed the order for
purchase with his own name but contends he was acting on behalf
of a corporation. The case holds that a person who signs a simple
contract without designating that he is acting as agent for another
is personally liable on the contract. However, in Quaker Hill, Inc.
v. Parr,0 the attempt to hold the promoter of a proposed corpora-
tion personally liable on a contract was defeated. Quaker Hill sold
goods to Denver Memorial Nursery, Inc., and a contract and promis-
sory note were executed wherein Parr signed as the president of the
purchasing corporation. Plaintiff knew that the purchasing corpora-
tion had not been formed at the time of making the contract, but
urged the defendant to go ahead anyway. Plaintiff's position is that
defendant is personally liable as a promoter of the corporation. This
is the general rule. The court refused to apply the rule because the
plaintiff, being fully aware of the non-existence of the proposed
corporation, urged the entry into the contract in the name of the
corporation and thereby showed an intent to contract with the cor-
poration, solely, and not with the promoter individually.
In Baumgartner v. Burt," Burt, as agent for various insurance
companies, sued Baumgartner for unpaid premiums of numerous
policies of insurance and recovered a judgment. The judgment was
reversed in favor of Baumgartner for the reason that the insurer is
the real party in interest, and as such, is the proper person to en-
force the liability for unpaid premiums. The decision does state
9 358 P.2d 599 (Colo. 1961).
10 364 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1961).
11 365 P.2d 681 (Colo. 1961).
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that an agent may sue in his own name when the insurer holds him
liable for premiums, and he had paid the one in question.
1 2
Reformation of deeds was sought, but denied, in Segelke v. Kil-
mer.13 The holding reiterates the rule that the evidence necessary
to secure reformation must be clear, unequivocal and indubitable.
Reformation cannot be had "unless there is a preliminary or prior
agreement, either written or verbal between the parties, furnishing
the basis for rectification, or to which the instrument can be con-
formed."'1 4 Kilmer had leased her property to Ohio Oil Company
under an oil and gas lease reserving to herself the proceeds from
one-eighth of the oil and gas produced from the leased premises.
The lease contained the so-called "entirety clause."' 5 Thereafter,
Kilmer conveyed 160 acres of the leased land to her brother Cecil,
reserving one-half of the gas, oil and mineral rights. Cecil then
traded 120 of these acres to another defendant, excepting from the
conveyance the reservation by Kilmer, subject to the lease of Ohio.
Oil was discovered and produced for approximately five years, with
all royalty payments being made by the lessee to Kilmer until an
assignee of the lease discovered the entirety clause and withheld
further payment. Kilmer then sought to reform the deed claiming
that it was the intention of Cecil and his grantee that Kilmer should
have all royalty payments for oil produced on her retained property.
,The trial court's decree reforming the deeds was reversed because
the parties had never agreed upon the entirety clause of the lease.
There was no showing that the warranty deeds were intended to
be free from the operation of that clause.
III. CONSIDERATION
In the following four cases, the direct issue was whether or not
there was adequate consideration to support a promise. In Burch v.
Burch,16 recitation of receipt of $10 and other good and valuable
consideration for a one-third interest in a described business, its as-
sets and profits, in the absence of contrary evidence, was held to be
a sufficient consideration for the promise to transfer the one-third
interest. Accordingly, judgment for plaintiff for an accounting of
profits was affirmed.
In United W. Minerals Co. v. Hannsen,17 the lessee appealed
from an adverse judgment on the pleadings in favor of the lessor
for the second year's rental under certain mining leases of unpa-
tented lode claims. Judgment for lessor was affirmed. The lessee
contended that the lessor had failed to make a discovery of minerals
on any of the leased mining claims, and therefore possessed no
property rights which could be made the subject matter of a lease,
and consequently asserted there was a failure of consideration for
the leases. The case states it is well recognized that location and
12 Since most agency agreements with insurance companies provide that the agent is personally
liable to the insurance company for the amount of the premium after the passage of a thirty, sixty
or ninety day period, it would appear that the agent is, under the above case, liable to the com-
pany on the one hand, and yet disabled from suing, without an assignment of the insurance com-
pany's interest, on the other hand.
13 360 P.2d 423 (Cola. 1961).
14 Id. at 426.
15 Id. at 425. "[AII rents and royalties accuring hereunder shall be treated as an entirety and
shall be divided among and paid to the separate owners in the proportions that the acreage owned
by each such owner bears to the entire leased acreage."
16358 P.2d 1011 (Colo. 1961).
17 363 P.2d 677 (Colo. 1961).
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posting of the claim may precede the actual discovery of ore of
value. Prior to discovery, the prospector is protected, and has rights,
only against forcible and clandestine entries upon the situs of his
workings so long as he diligently prosecutes his work towards dis-
covery. These protected rights were transferred, by the leases, to
United, and constituted the lessor's consideration for the leases.' 8
In Coughlin v. Truitt,19 it was held that a promissory note could
not be renounced or released by parol, therefore judgment for the
maker-defendant was reversed and the trial court was instructed to
enter judgment for the plaintiffs. The maker contended that the
payees of the note orally renounced the note. The Colorado statute
20
was construed as requiring that a renunciation of the rights in a
negotiable instrument be in writing, unless the instrument itself be
delivered to the person liable thereon. From this it follows that as
between the maker and the holder of a note the holder's written re-
nunciation, even if not supported by consideration, could be set up,
successfully, as a defense on a promissory note.
Consideration for an oral promise to pay an increased price for
asphalt paving materials was found to be lacking in H. & W. Paving
Co. v. Asphalt Paving Co.21 H. & W. contracted with Asphalt to
purchase its requirements of paving materials from Asphalt for
a period of five years at prices stated in the contract. Before Feb-
ruary 1, of any year, Asphalt was entitled to advise H. & W. in
writing of increased costs in materials and labor requiring an in-
crease in the original prices. In the absence of such notification, the
original price controlled. Asphalt sued to enforce a claimed oral
agreement increasing prices, but admitted not having complied with
the terms of the contract concerning price increase. Judgment for
Asphalt was reversed. The court held that even if there had been
a subsequent oral agreement for a price change, such agreement
was unsupported by any consideration. Where duties are imposed
by a written contract, in order that a subsequent parol agreement
may avoid such duties, the subsequent parol agreement must b Fup--
ported by consideration moving to the party who is en-itled to
enforce the terms of the written agreement.22 QUERY: Could the
parties to such a contract orally agree without consideration to
waive the conditions of notice and investigation since such condi-
tions do not appear to be the agreed exchange of performances?
This proposition was not considered.
IV. CONDITIONS
In McKendrie v. Noel,23 plaintiff sold rug cleaning machines
to defendant who bought them relying on an advertisement that
the machines would be installed and operate satisfactorily. The
machines were not installed properly and did not operate satis-
factorily. Such installation and operation were held to be condi-
tions precedent to the purchaser's duty to pay the purchase price.
IS See Martz, Pick and Shovel Mining Low in an Atomic Age: A Case for Reform, 27 Rocky Mt.
L. Rev. 375, 380 (1955), cited, id. at 680.
19 367 P.2d 350 (Colo. 1961).
20 Colo. Rev. Stat. 95-1-122 (1953).
21 364 P.2d 185 (Colo. 1961).
22 It would have been competent for the parties to hove entered into an agreement to rescind
the original contract and then to have entered into an oral agreement on the increased price. See
Schwortzreich v. Bauman-Bash, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921) and Doherty v. Doe, 18
Colo. 456, 33 Pac. 165 (1893).
23 362 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1961).
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Judgment for the purchaser on his counterclaim to rescind the
purchase and recover the down payment anid out-of-pocket costs
of installation was affirmed.
The employer's defense, asserted in Empire Diesel, Inc. v.
Brown,24 to the employee's action for wages due and loans made
to the employer was an accord and satisfaction of the claims. De-
fendant delivered a check bearing a restrictive endorsement read-
ing: "Endorsement constitutes payment in full for all . . . claims
against the company and the maker of this check. ' 25 Although
the employee retained the check he did not endorse or cash it.
Since the stated condition, i.e., "endorsement" did not occur, the
retention of it was not an acceptance of an offer to compromise the
disputed claim.
In Sanders v. Hart,26 a contract provided that the stock received
by defendant from plaintiff was to be paid for, at a stated price,
when sold. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed in a holding that
sale of the stock by defendant was a condition precedent to the
duty to pay for it, and that condition had not occurred.
In Scott v. Huntzinger,27 the broker sued for a commission
arising out of the sale of certain oil leases by the defendants to one
White. A written contract between the broker and defendants pro-
vided: "If the deal with White results in our sale of the property
as provided in the Agreement with him, then we will pay to you
as a commission .... -12 the amount sued for. Judgment had been
entered in favor of the broker for $5,000 and this was reversed.
Reversal was required inasmuch as White, who had taken only
an option to purchase the property, let the option lapse and there-
after a new and different deal for purchase was entered into and
consummated between defendants and White. There was no bad
faith on the part of defendants or White, nor any attempt to deprive
plaintiff of his commission. Plantiff's right to a commission was
contingent upon the condition of the original deal with White re-
sulting in a sale. This condition did not occur. The result of this
case seems to be well supported.
2 9
In Jefferson County Bank v. Armored Motors Serv.,30 the court
24 361 P.2d 964 (Colo. 1961).
25 Id. at 966.
26 365 P.2d 42 (Colo. 1961).
27 365 P.2d 692 (Colo. 1961).
28 Id. at 693.
29 See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 86 (1938) and Schonfeld v. Zinn, 192 lI.App. 456 (1915).
30366 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1961).
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held that the provision of a written contract between the defendant
and the bank, limiting the defendant's absolute maximum liability
to $30,000 and providing that any monies or property in excess of
that figure which the bank might entrust to the defendant should
be the complete responsibility of the bank, was reasonable and fair
and not contrary to public policy.
In Dawson v. Clark,3 1 the plaintiff-employee was held to have
violated an implied condition to his employment agreement by
competing with and injuring the business of the defendant-employ-
ers. Defendants purchased a sheet metal business from plaintiff.
As part of the purchase contract, defendants agreed to retain plain-
tiff in a supervisory capacity for one year. Within a six month
period plaintiff was discharged and brought this action for breach
of the contract. Defendants alleged that during his employment,
plaintiff carried on a similar business and at times even submitted
bids in competition with defendants. The lower court found this to
be the case and directed judgment for defendants on the grounds
that the dismissal was justified. Judgment was affirmed.
V. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT
A school teacher claimed his dismissal was a breach of contract
and sued for his salary for the balance of the year in School Dist.
38 v. Thomas.3 2 The contract with the defendant school district
provided that the teacher could not be dismissed "without good
cause shown, which includes a hearing." No charges were ever
tendered; no hearing was ever held; and no opportunity to be heard
was presented. The dismissal was therefore in violation of contract
and statute.
33
In Froetschner v. Silkman,34 the supreme court approved the
orders in an action for a declaratory judgment. The court appor-
tioned the soil bank payment which was received by the vendor
of land, during the year of sale, in accordance with the proportion
of time vendor and vendee, respectively, owned the property. The
court also approved an apportionment of the part of the first year's
delay rental on an oil and gas lease, executed by the vendor and
known to the vendee, on the same basis. The contract had been
silent as to these matters. The apportionment appears to have been
based on purely equitable considerations.
In Berry v. Asphalt Paving Co.,3 5 Berry and Keller entered
into a written agreement whereby Berry sold all of his interest
"whatever it may be" in the Paving Company to Keller for a fixed
sum. The parties also agreed that if a named accountant's financial
statement up to the date of the agreement showed an operating
profit, Keller should pay one-half of it to Berry. When this profit
was determined, Keller tendered the one-half profit to Berry who
refused to accept it claiming that it had been incorrectly determined.
The court found that plaintiff-Berry, and not the defendant, had
breached the agreement since the accountant's determination of
31 358 P.2d 591 (Colo. 1961).
32 363 P.2d 700 (Colo. 1961).
33 Colo. Rev. Stat. 123-17-1 (1953) "No teacher shall Le dismissed without good cause .
Good cause requires "specific accusation, notice, evidence of the charge before the board in its
official capacity, and an opportunity to the teacher to be heard." School Dist. 2 v. Shuck, 49 Colo.
526, 531, 113 Pac. 511, 513 (1911).
34 362 P.2d 191 (Colo. 1961).
35 360 P.2d 980 (Colo. 1961).
.DICTA
MAY-JUNE, 1962
profit was not shovn to have been associated with fraud or bad
faith and was final, not subject to review, and binding upon both
parties. This view was supported by the contract language.
In Wilson v. Automobile Owners Ass'n Ins. Co.,36 an insurance
policy providing insurance for accidental bodily injury, sustained
while driving or riding within any automobile, "caused solely by
reason of an automobile, truck or bus accident" was construed to
cover the bodily injury of a passenger who was thrown to the floor
of a car which had to stop suddenly on rough road in order to avoid
hitting another car. The policy was not restricted to an accident to
the automobile; the language was construed to include an injury
occurring from an accident in the automobile. As has been fre-
quently stated, insurance policies are construed most strongly
against those who write them, namely the insurance companies.
Accordingly, judgment was reversed in favor of the insured. The
policy did not define an automobile accident.
In Wise v. Nu-Tone Products Co.,37 Wise, who had been the
general partner in a limited partnership composed of himself and
his three sisters, contracted to sell "all of his right, title and inter-
est" in the assets of the limited partnership to his three sisters for
a stipulated price. The sisters paid the price and formed the plain-
tiff corporation. After delivery of a bill of sale conveying the in-
terest in the limited partnership, the sisters discovered that a policy
of life insurance had been taken out on the life of Wise, naming
Wise's previous general partner, and thereafter the limited partner-
ship, as beneficiary. Plaintiff claimed as assignee of the sisters.
Summary judgment in favor of plaintiff for the cash :surrender
value of the policy, as of the date of the sale to the sisters, was
granted and affirmed. In so doing, the court held that where, as
here, a policy has been paid for by partnership funds, it is partner-
ship property in the absence of a showing that the partners had
a contrary intention. Accordingly, the cash value of the policy was,
during the lifetime of the insured, partnership property.
The contractor in Granberry v. Perlmutter3s agreed to build
an addition to Granberry's home consisting of a double garage and
two bedrooms and a bath over the garage. The contractor filed suit
for the last payment and certain extras. The contract provided
(with reference to a bathroom): "Colorado Fixtures to consist of
one closet, one basin, one bath with shower over tub." Another
version of the contract, apparently introduced into evidence, pro-
vided "ceramic tile floor and walls four feet high and four feet over
tub." The trial court allowed payment to the contractor for the
inclusion of the ceramic tiling, as an extra, holding the same to be
a luxury. In view of the two versions of contract, the supreme
ccurt held that an ambiguity existed and that it was incumbent
upon the contractor to have resolved the ambiguity. Further the
cost of inclusion of ceramic tile in a new addition, especially since
wall and floor coverings in the bath are different from the wall and
floor coverings elsewhere, should be pre-determined by the con-
tractor. Therefore the allowance of the cost of such covering as an
extra was unwarranted.
36366 P.2d 654 (Colo. 1961).
37367 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1961).
38364 P.2d 211 (Colo. 1961).
DICTA
MAY-JuNE, 1962
In Burt v. Craig,39 the declaratory judgment entered by the
trial court was affirmed. Craig was the purchaser, under a written
contract, of the Burt Insurance Agency. The contract provided
that in the event of a default by Craig in payment of certain month-
ly amounts due on account of the purchase price, Burts had the
right to terminate the contract, retaining all previous payments as
liquidated damages. They had the further right to reassume the
agency and its equipment with the appreciation or depreciation of
the agency being figured by a formula consisting of the average
annual net commissions times 13/4, plus furniture, fixtures and
equipment. Burts attempted to show by parol evidence that certain
commissions on so-called "target or public" insurance business were
to be excluded from the average commissions. This evidence was
rejected. The court approved the holding that had it been intended
such commissions be excluded, a provision to that effect should
have been inserted in the agreement.
The broker in Miller v. L. C. Fulenwider, Inc.,41 recovered a
judgment in trial to the court for $75,000 on an oral listing by
defendant Miller to sell certain stock in Miller's Supermarkets, Inc.
The broker negotiated the sale and the seller circumvented the
broker, claiming the listing had expired, and dealt directly with
the purchaser. The trial court's finding that the sale was caused
to be made through plaintiff's efforts and its judgment for plaintiff
were affirmed. Miller contended that evidence of an oral listing
was inadmissible and pointed to two exhibits, in writing, which
he contended limited the listing to a certain time and could not be
explained or varied by parol evidence. In rejecting this contention,
it was held that the written agreements were ambiguous and an
inaccurate expression of the listing between the parties. Under
this state of facts, issues were presented as to whether the parties
had made a contract and if so whether the writings expressed that
contract. Accordingly, evidence which would tend to explain or
clarify the intent and hopes of the parties was admissible.
4'
VI. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
The case of Cold Spring Tungsten, Inc. v. American Steel &
Iron Works, Inc 4 illustrates the discharge of a disputed claim by
39 360 P.2d 976 (Colo. 1961).
40362 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1961).
41 See 3 Corbin, Contracts § 573 01960).
42 361 P.2d 773 (Colo. 1961).
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accord and satisfaction. American contracted to perform certain
work for Tungsten. When a dispute arose concerning two aspects
of the project American made repairs demanded by Tungsten in
accordance with an agreement evidenced by a letter from Tungsten
to American. Tungsten later refused payment. American secured
judgment and an order directing foreclosure of its material and
labor lien. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that
the parties had settled a disputed claim by the plaintiff's correction
and the defendant's acceptance of the corrections. The defendant
was estopped from urging a matter which may have constituted a
counterclaim existing at the time of making the compromise.
In Aronoff v. Carraher,43 certain additional questions, not re-
solved in the previous Aronoff case, 44 were raised and answered.
The court held, in regard to accord and satisfaction, that the receipt
and retention by the receiver of the insurance company of a check
marked "full payment" does not relieve the policy holder from
paying any remaining balance if the assessment as originally com-
puted by the receiver was in an erroneous amount. The receiver,
being an officer of the court, has a duty to assess and collect in
accordance with a court order.
The court refused to find an accord and satisfaction of plaintiff's
claim for unpaid commissions in Pospicil v. Hammers.45 Plaintiff-
salesman sued to recover commissions due and owing to him on
automobile sales made over a period of years while in the employ-
ment of one defendant as a proprietor, three other defendants as
partners in an automobile sales agency, and a corporation as the
last employer. Judgment against the individuals and the corpora-
tion was rendered in favor of the plaintiff by the trial court. It was
admitted that if any debt was owing, it was owing by the corpora-
tion. Inasmuch as plaintiff failed to establish when the debt for
commissions arose, judgment against the individual defendants
was reversed. In affirming the judgment against the corporate
defendant, the court found that checks which had been tendered
to the plaintiff, from time to time, and accepted by him had not
been tendered nor accepted as a full and final settlement of all
claims up to that date. Plaintiff testified that he had always pressed
for settlement on his commissions and had been led to believe that
settlement would be forthcoming though it was never made. The
court quoted Pitts v. National Independent Fisheries Co.46 as
follows:
In order to constitute an accord and satisfaction, it is
necessary that the money should be offered in full satisfac-
tion of the demand, and be accompanied by such acts and
declarations as amount to a condition that the money, if
accepted, is accepted in satisfaction; and it must be such
that the party to whom it is offered is bound to understand
therefrom that, if he takes it, he takes it subject to such
conditions.
47
43 361 P.2d 354 (Colo. 1961).
44 Aronoff v. Pioneer Mut. Compensation Co., 134 Colo. 395, 304 P.2d 1083 (1956).
45 365 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1961).
46 71 Colo. 316, 206 Pac. 571 (1922).
47 Id. at 318, 206 Pac. at 571.
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See Empire Diesel, Inc. v. Brown,48 supra, which could have
been included in this section of the review.
VII. ADVANCED COMMISSIONS
In Argonaut Builders, Inc. v. Dare4 9 the employer, Argonaut,
sued Dare for claimed loans. Dare answered that the monies sued
for had been advanced to him as anticipated commissions without
agreement to repay. The trial court's dismissal was reversed and
a new trial ordered. This case is something of a landmark in that
it distinguishes Dare's position, described as an independent con-
tractor, from the position of employees in two previous Colorado
cases.50 Where an employee has received advances in regular
amounts in lieu of salary or wages, a presumption arises that these
advances are recoverable only from commissions and thus an excess
debit balance in the employee's account cannot be collected by the
employer. In Dare's case, he was credited with 60% of the profit,
when collected, on any building or remodeling job; charged with
advances as they were made; and, also charged with losses on the
basis of 60% of the loss on the applicable job. Regular statements
of account were rendered to him. Being in the nature of an inde-
pendent contractor, Dare became a bona fide debtor, unless, on a
new trial, he would be able to show that he was an employee and
should be treated as the employees were in the two distinguished
cases. 51
VIII. FRAUD, ETC.
The following cases in which fraud or undue influence became
an issue at one point or another have been divided so as to empha-
size the effect of the fraud (a) upon an attempted rescission, (b) as
a defense to an action upon the contract, or (c) as a ground for
damages where a material fact had been concealed. The cases deal
with the measure of damages for fraud and deceit and have been
included for reasons stated in the introductory note to this review.
A. Rescission of Contract or Deed for Fraud or Undue Influence
In Hinshaw v. Hinshaw,52 Dr. Hinshaw, being then eighty years
of age, married one of the defendants. Shortly thereafter, he made
and executed deeds conveying a house and a ranch to his new wife.
The wife then conveyed the house to her sister, a co-defendant. The
doctor brought action to cancel the deeds alleging fraud and undue
influence but died before trial. His executor was substituted. At
the trial, sufficient evidence was introduced to show that the new
wife had a plan or scheme to get rid of opposition and any impedi-
ments even prior to her marriage to the doctor. The trial court
granted a motion to dismiss after the defendants rested their case
without presenting any evidence. By reason of the age of Dr. Hin-
shaw at the time of execution of the deeds and other evidence, the
supreme court, in reversing, found that plaintiff had sustained the
burden of proving the existence of undue influence in securing the
48 361 P.2d 964 (Colo. 1961).
49 359 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1961).
50 Gross Bergman Mfg. Co. v. Fell, 80 Colo. 239, 250 Pac. 387 (1926), and Bankers Union Life
Ins. Co. v. Atschel, 97 Colo. 377, 49 P.2d 385 (1935).
51 Ibid.
52 365 P.2d 815 (Colo. 1961).
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deeds, making it incumbent upon defendants to present evidence
to rebut the presumption and inference of undue influence, the same
being presumed from the relationship, circumstances, and condi-
tions of the contracting parties. Since the defendants rested with-
out presenting any evidence, at which time their motion to, dismiss
was granted, and since they then had the burden of proving the lack
of such influence or fraud but did not do so, they are not entitled
to a new trial. Accordingly, judgment for defendants was reversed
and ordered entered in favor of plaintiff.
To set aside a deed the evidence of fraud must be clear and con-
vincing. Such evidence was found to be lacking in Schwindt v.
Schwindt,53 and the deed complained of was not set aside.
In General Credit Corp. v. Bill Olsen's Motor, Inc.,5 4 rescission
was denied. Motor, Inc., sold an automobile to a corporation and
delivered the automobile together with the certificate of origin to
A, the vice-president and general-manager of the corporation, and
received what purported to be the corporation's check on its Texas
bank account. A then took the automobile to Nebraska, presented
the certificate of origin to General Credit and applied for a $2500
loan against the automobile. General Credit verified A's authority
to act on behalf of the corporation and granted the loan, applying
$500 of it to A's old account with the lender giving the balance to
A in cash. The purchase-money check bounced, and Motor, Inc.,
then caused the automobile to be picked up and returned. In the
meantime, General Credit secured a valid mortgage on the automo-
bile and brought a separate action for recovery of the auto. In re-
versing judgment in favor of Motor, Inc., the supreme court held
that General Credit was a bona fide purchaser for value. 55 This re-
sult is in accordance with the Uniform Sales Act.56 Judgment was
accordingly awarded against Motor, Inc., for the amount of the loan
less the $500 which had been credited by General Credit, on its
books, to the previous account of A.
53 363 P.2d 1043 (Colo. 1961).
54 363 P.2d 489 (Colo. 1961).
55 General Credit's inquiry of A's authority to act for the corporation which purchased the car
was an inquiry dealing only with A's authority and not an inquiry as to the validity of the suffi-
ciency of the corporation's title to the automobile.
56 Colo. Rev. Stat. 121-1-24 (1953). The Act provides "Where the seller of goods has a voidable
title thereto, but his title has not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good
title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the
seller's defect in title." In this instance, General Credit is the buyer and the corporation is the
seller with the defective title. The buyer had no notice of the seller's defective title.
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Benson, the insured, sued to recover the cost of an operation
which would have been included under the terms of a health or
medical payment insurance policy issued by Bankers, in Benson v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co.57 The trial court dismissed his complaint
after finding that Benson had made material misrepresentation of
his past medical history and that the seller's agent had falsely told
Benson that Bankers was not interested in any portion of his medi-
cal history except that which related to the five years prior to the
application for the policy. The application contained the language
that Bankers "is not bound by any knowledge of, or statements
made by, or to any agent, unless set forth herein."58 The court ap-
plied an applicable statute-"9 stating in part that "no statement or
declaration made to or by an agent, examiner or other person, not
contained in the application shall be taken or considered as having
been made to or brought to the notice or knowledge of the company,
or as charging it with any liability by reason thereof." Accordingly,
the agent's statement that the company was not interested in Ben-
son's medical history except during the five years prior to the ap-
plication could not relieve Benson of the duty to answer truthfully
concerning questions directed to that prior medical history. QUERY:
Could not Benson, if he acted in good faith, bring an action in tort
against the agent?
In Woodhams v. Amy,60 action was brought to recover the bal-
ance of a savings account. The monies used to open the account had
originally been in a joint account in the name of the decedent and
a trustee under a written trust instrument. The trustee later placed
the funds in her own name. In holding that the action by the exe-
cutor to recover the funds was well founded, the court stated that
it was an established principle "that the fiduciary could not take
advantage of her trust position to obtain the proceeds of a trust ac-
count unless she maintained the burden placed upon her to show
that the transaction giving her the benefit as survivor was fair, just
and reasonable." 61
B. Fraud as a Defense to an Action on Contract
In Stoner v. Marshal,6 2 the payee of a promissory note, given as
part of the purchase price of a business, sued the maker of the note
and won, notwithstanding the maker's contention that the note was
induced by the payee's fraudulent representation concerning im-
mediate past profits of the business. The purchaser, perhaps un-
fortunately, stipulated to dismiss her counterclaim for damages
based upon the alleged fraud. Thereafter the purchaser's attempt
to defend the suit on the note by an allegation of fraudulent in-
ducement was rejected on the authority of Handy v. Rogers.63 It is
unfortunate that the court chose to support its opinion by quoting
language of Tisdel v. Central Savings Bank & Trust Co.,64 for the
quoted language from Tisdel is at best unwisely worded, and as to
57 362 P.2d 1039 (Colo. 1961).
58 Id. at 1040.
59 Colo. Rev. Stat. 72-1-25 (1953).
60 365 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1961).
61 Id. at 697.
62 358 P.2d 1021 (Colo. 1961).
63 143 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 819 (1960), citing with approval Restatement, Contracts § 480 (1932).
64 90 Colo. 114, 6 P.2d 912 (1931).
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principal features, the only similarity is that both actions were upon
promissory notes.
6 5
In Bell Press, Inc. v. Phillips,66 Phillips, as assignee of a note
given by Bell and the corporate defendant to Golden Press, Inc.,
brought action upon the note. After allowing certain reductions,
judgment was awarded to Phillips. Defendants sought reversal
claiming that part of the consideration for the note had been the
transfer of the accounts receivable which plaintiffs' assignor had,
by its general manager, represented to be "collectible" at the time
of the transaction. In discussing this phase of the case, the supreme
court pointed out that since there was no warrant of collectibility,
the person making the statement that these accounts receivable
were "collectible" did no more than state his opinion. Such a state-
ment was not a statement of present fact nor a false representation
of a material fact which either existed at the time of the statement
or had existed in the past. At best, it meant that, in the speaker's
opinion, the claim was legally demandable and the debtor was of
competent ability to pay it, but it did not mean that the debtor
would pay the debt. The contract did not contain any provision for
deduction of amounts due on the assigned accounts which might
later prove to be uncollectible.
C. Concealed Defect as Ground for Damages in Fraud and Deceit
The defendant company won a reversal of an adverse judgment
in Denver Business Sales Co. v. Lewis."7 Plaintiffs had purchased
a home which had been constructed by one of the defendants and
sold through another. The home had been built on soil which was
rendered unstable by reason of certain qualities of the soil which
permitted it to expand and contract in such a manner as to damage
the foundations and walls of the home. An instruction was given
to the jury that plaintiffs might recover on the theory of a con-
cealed defect if the defendants knew "or by the exercise of ordinary
65 In Stoner v. Marshal the court quotes Tisdel, id. at 917, "If one elects to affirm the agree-
ment, after full knowledge of the truth respecting the false and fraudulent representations, and
thereafter continues to carry it out and receive its benefits, he may not thereafter maintain an action
in damages for deceit, because this would constitute a ratification of the agreement and a condona.
tion of the fraud; otherwise one might, with knowledge of fraud, speculate upon the advantages
or disadvantages of an agreement, receive its benefits, and thereafter repudiate all its obligations."
(Emphasis added.) In Tisdel the continuation and the benefits consisted of the defendants giving
not only a first note in satisfaction of prior obligations, which note they claimed was induced by
fraudulent representations, but, with knowledge of the claimed fraud, giving also a second note
in satisfaction of the first and a third note in satisfaction of the second, all the while having secured
benefits of a forbearance of the plaintiff to sue on an original guaranty. In Stoner v. Marshal,
Stoner simply remained in possession of the donut shop and made five payments on her purchase-
money note. The second and third notes in Tisdel were truly evidence of ratification of the original
note and evidence that there was no fraud in the inducement of that note. This element is lacking
in Stoner v. Marshal. This ratification, in Tiscel, would be an estoppel to an action for damages
for deceit. The pronoun "this" in the citation quoted from Tisdel, is completely baffling if intended
to refer to maintenance of an action in damages for deceit as being a condonation of the fraud.
The only sense in which such an action for damages is a ratification is that by bringing an action
for damages the injured party waives the right or power to avoid the contract for the fraud. In
same instances, foregoing an action for rescission, will permit alternative actions: (a) an action in
deceit for damages based on the tort or, (b) an action in contract as for breach of warranty. The
measure of damages in each instance will be the difference between the contract price and what the
value would be if the subject matter were as represented ("loss-of-bargain rule"). In the action
for fraud, exemplary damages and body judgment may both be recoverable. In the action for
breach of warranty, neither of these elements is recoverable. In the action for rescission, based
on fraud, the parties would be restored to status quo and a body judgment could issue. Compare
Aoberg v. Harman, 144 Colo. 579, 358 P.2d 601 (1960). This reviewer is unable to see any possi.
bility of condonation of the fraud where the "defrauded" purchaser simply remains in possession
and continues to make payment without entering into a substituted contract as was done in Tisdel.
The remainder of the quoted portion of the Tisdel case deals only with the waiver of the right or
power to rescind by-failure to act promptly. Such waiver prevents the defrauded party from saying
on the one hand there is a contract and on the other there is not a contract.
66 364 P.2d 398 (Colo. 1961).
67 365 P.2d 895 (Colo. 1961).
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prudence should have known .... the nature of the soil and failed
to disclose it to the buyers." This instruction was apparently based
upon dicta in a previous case.6 The supreme court made it clear
that its previous holdings were not intended to establish a precedent
that liability for fraud founded upon a non-disclosure would exist
without proof of actual knowledge of the fact which was allegedly
concealed. Accordingly, judgment was reversed with instructions
to grant a new trial.
D. Measure of Damages for Fraud and Deceit
In Corder v. Laws,6 9 the vendor of real property, in order to
produce the appearance of value which would support the asking
price of the property, submitted, through his agent, to the vendees
a written five year lease between the vendor and a fraternal organ-
ization at $200 per month covering the second floor of the premises.
At the time of this submission, the vendor knew that the fraternal
organization had already determined that it would move out of the
premises, but he had prevailed upon the organization not to move.
Relying upon the representation of an existing lease, the plaintiffs
purchased the property. Three months later the fraternal organiza-
tion moved without ever having paid any rent. The vendees af-
firmed the transaction and brought an action in tort for fraud and
deceit. The trial court directed the verdict for plaintiffs on the is-
sue of liability and submitted the question of damages to the jury
instructing them that the measure of damages is the difference be-
tween the actual value of the property and what its value would
have been had the vendor's representations been true. In affirming
a $5,200 verdict in favor of plaintiffs, the supreme court approved
the direction of the entry of a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on
the question of liability since the evidence was such that reasonable
men could reach but one conclusion, namely, that the vendor had
been guilty of fraud, and further affirmed the election by Colorado
to follow the loss-of-bargain rule instead of the out-of-pocket rule
in arriving at damages in cases of fraud.
An excellent discussion of loss-of-bargain damages is given in
the case of Shirley v. Merritt.70 Plaintiff sought to secure a new
68 See Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960), quoting from Davis v. Hopkins, 50
Ga.App. 654, 179 S.E. 213 (1935).
69 366 P.2d 369 (Colo. 1961).
70 364 P.2d 192 (Colo. 1961).
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trial on the question of damages alone after a jury verdict in her
favor based on fraud and deceit. Plaintiff was the purchaser of a
laundromat. The selling agent, through one of its partners, Mr. Cor-
bin, had represented the gross business during a three to four month
period prior to sale as $1,200 to $1,400 per month. Plaintiff proved
that gross sales during her operation of approximately seven months
averaged $650 per month. Plaintiff thereupon sold the business for
$7,800 in an effort to mitigate her loss, and brought this action for
actual and exemplary damages. The jury found that fraud had been
committed and the only issue was the question of the adequacy of
damages. The court instructed that the measure of damages was
loss-of-bargain. 71 The supreme court held that by reason of the
great gap between the damages awarded and the damages evi-
denced the jury had abused their discretion in fixing the amount of
damages, and a new trial was ordered limited to actual and exem-
plary damages.
72
IX. BROKER'S SUITS FOR COMMISSIONS
In the cases reviewed, oral listings fared better than written
listings. However, this was only because the brokers produced buy-
ers under oral listings but did not produce buyers in the cases in-
volving written listings.
The broker in Minissale v. Goldman,73 was denied recovery on
his suit for commission on well recognized principles, the trial court
having found that the broker failed to establish that he was the ef-
ficient agent or procuring cause of the sale.
Brewer, the owner-seller in Brewer v. Williams,74 presents an
example "of an owner circumventing his broker by appropriating
his client and seeking to escape his commission by slight changes
in the terms of the [sale]."75 The employment of the broker in the
instant case was by an oral contract. Following this oral contract
the broker's saleswomen made continuous efforts with the knowl-
edge and encouragement of Brewer to sell her tavern and real prop-
erty. Upon being advised that Brewer would sell the tavern and
lease the property, one of the saleswomen produced an interested
buyer. Thereafter Brewer terminated all contact with the broker
and its saleswomen and within a few days concluded a sale of the
property on terms essentially like those which she had indicated a
willingness to accept. Having produced the purchaser, ready, will-
ing and able to purchase on the terms and conditions prescribed by
71 The instruction as to damages submitted by the court, told the jury that compensatory damages
"are measured by the difference between the actual value at the time of purchase and what the value
might have been if the representations had been true." Id. at 196.
72 Had the damages been liquidated and undisputed, the supreme court would have exercised
its authority to increase the judgment to correspond with the liquidated amount. Plaintiff's evidence
of value at the time of sale was based upon an expert's testimony that since the water consumption
at the laundromat, prior to sale, was essentially the some as that after sale, the income being pro-
portional to the water consumption, the income before must have been the same, essentially, as
after sale and that based upon the after sale income the value would be $7,800 to $8,000. The
jury having awarded $1,850 actual damages and $450 exemplary damages, it appeared to the
supreme court that the jury concluded the market value of the subject business at the time of
purchase was approximately $15,500. There was no evidence to estab ish this value, whereas
plaintiff's uncontradicted evidence as to value at the time of purchase was stated by the supreme
court to have been legally sufficient to the extent that the jury was not justified in disregarding
plaintiff's evidence of value. Upon retrial, it was ordered that instructions regarding the definition
of market value and an instruction concerning the expert's testimony should be given even though
the parties may not have asked for same.
73363 P.2d 488 (Colo. 1961).
74 362 P.2d 1033 (Colo. 1961).




the owner, the court held the broker may have the commission, not-
withstanding the change of terms which result from further negotia-
tions of the owner and purchaser.
In Miller v. L. C. Fulenwider, Inc., 6 the so-called written list-
ing contracts were ambiguous. The actual listing which the court
enforced was essentially an oral agreement established by parol evi-
dence. The case is discussed above under Interpretation of Con-
tract.
X. QUASI CONTRACT
In Wistrand v. Leach Realty Co.,77 plaintiff (Leach) acted as
agent for Evans in sale of a home to Wistrand. Plaintiff drew up a
settlement sheet and payments were made accordingly. Later, plain-
tiff discovered that certain items properly chargeable to Wistrand
had not been placed on the sheet. This action was brought to re-
cover the loss on theory of unjust enrichment. Judgment for plain-
tiff was affirmed.
In quasi contract neither privity nor promise is necessary. The
action was for the purpose of putting the parties in proper position
so neither suffered loss nor made gain.
XI. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
Three joint venturers brought separate complaints against a
fourth venturer for an accounting. All complaints were consolidated
for trial in Griffith v. Cooper.7 8 The evidence showed the defendant
to have suffered a loss in excess of $17,000. Defendant appealed from
dismissal of the complaints alleging that the court was under duty
to enter judgment for defendant, even though he did not affirma-
tively move for judgment in the pleadings. The action was reversed
and remanded with directions to enter judgment against the plain-
tiffs for their respective shares of the proven loss of the joint
venture. The case contains a warning that a suit for an accounting
includes an offer by the plaintiffs to pay any balance that may be
found against them.
Two cases involved matters relating to third party beneficiary
contracts. The right of an adoptive child, as a third party donee
beneficiary to a decretal contract between the adoptive child's
father and the court decreeing the adoption, was upheld in Pool v.
76 362 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1961).
77 364 P.2c 396 (Colo. 1961).
78 359 P.2d 360 (Colo. 1961).
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Harold.7 9 The adoption decree recited an agreement of the adopting
father with the court not to disinherit the adopted child. The father
then bequeathed only $10 of his $9,800 estate to the adopted child,
and the rest to strangers. The adoptive parent was held to be bound
by his agreement which deprived him of the power to dispose of
his property in a manner contrary to the third party donee con-
tract. Notwithstanding a basic dislike to such forced inheritance,
the court held it was bound to follow Dillingham v. Schmidt,80
and it distinguished the present case from Quintrall v. Goldsmith.s1
In the present case and in the Dillingham case, the plaintiff was
the adoptive child of the adopting parent to the date of that adopt-
ing parent's death. In the Quintrall case the plaintiff did not bear
the relationship of an adopted child to the adopting parent as of
the date of the adopting parent's death, there having been a subse-
quent adoption of the child during the lifetime of the first adopt-
ing parents. In Field Family Constr. Co. v. Ryan, 2 a judgment
creditor or Florado Construction Company garnisheed Field Family
Construction Company which had assumed the debts of Florado to
third parties. The assumption of debts was held to be a chose in
action owned by the judgment debtor which the garnishee was
bound to report in its answer to the garnishee summons.
In Wilder v. Barker,83 a mother borrowed money on her prop-
erty for the accommodation of, and loaned the money to, her
daughter and son-in-law upon their promise to repay it. When the
mother sued the son-in-law, he raised two defenses: (1) Plaintiff
had orally released the daughter. (2) The debt was discharged in
bankruptcy. The supreme court affirmed the holdings that an oral
release, unsupported by consideration, is not binding and that the
defendant's failure to schedule the debt, plus his failure to notify
plaintiff of the bankruptcy resulted in the debt not being discharged
in bankruptcy.
A summary judgment in favor of defendant was affirmed in
Norton v. Dartmouth Skis, Inc. 4 Plaintiff sued for commissions
alleged to have accrued in 1952. The complaint was filed in 1959.
Affidavits filed under Colo. R. Civ. P. 56 established that the de-
fendant, continuously from 1937, had maintained a salesman in
Colorado who solicited orders, occasionally delivered skis, made
collections and credit investigations and arranged for *exchange of
defendant's products. Under these facts, the court held that the
corporation was at all time present in the State of Colorado for
purposes of service even though no consent to be sued or authoriza-
tion had been given to the agent (salesman) to accept .service of
process. The statute of limitations was not tolled as plaintiff
claimed.8 5
In Polichio v. Oliver Well Works, Inc.,8 6 the elements of an
79 367 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1961).
80 85 Colo. 28, 273 Pac. 21 (1928).
81 134 Colo. 410, 306 P.2d 246 (1956).
82360 P.2d 110 (Colo. 1961).
83 362 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1961).
84 364 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1961).
85 The court cited C. E. Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. District Court, 188 Colo. 270, 332 P.2d
208 (1958).
86 362 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1961).
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account stated were again reviewed.87 The trial court had erroneous-
ly instructed that the reception of statements of account coupled
with retention of them and a failure to object within a reasonable
time constituted an assent to the correctness of the account. Conse-
quently the action was remanded for a new trial. The court approved
the proposition that an account stated which related only to a numer-
ical computation is prima facie evidence of the amount due, whereas
such an account stated may be binding if it represents an agree-
ment of compromise or settlement of an unliquidated claim.8 8
Two cases dealt primarily with elements of contract damages.
In Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 9
plaintiffs claimed to hold seven options for the purchase of 234,000
shares, aggregate, in defendant, the option price being $2.00 per
share. On June 3, 1958, plaintiffs attempted to exercise the option.
Defendant refused to honor the same. The market price on the
stock, according to plaintiff's own evidence, varied from 85c to
$1.15 per share between June 1 and July 15, 1958. The court applied,
correctly, the Uniform Sales Act as the measure of plaintiffs' dam-
age, viz: the difference between the contract price and "the market
or current price of the goods at the time or times when the option
had been delivered or if no time was fixed, then at the time of
the refusal to deliver."90 On this basis, dismissal of plaintiffs' com-
plaint was warranted inasmuch as the option price was in excess
of the then current market price. Plaintiffs contended that special
circumstances existed which would permit the award of additional
damages and pointed to the fact that they paid $149,177.50 for the
options. However, the cost of the options is not a proximate damage
arising out of the refusal to issue the stock.
The court held in Hunter v. Wilson9l that the statute92 allowing
recovery of interest as damages in a contract action must be strictly
construed. Under this cited statute and a previously decided case
93
interest cannot be granted in an action for the fair and reasonable
value of work and services performed. Such an action is one for
quantum mer ; and as such is for an unliquidated demand. Un-
liquidated de ands are not included in the strict construction of
the statute.
In Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Kelley,94 the trial court's
refusal to grant a temporary injunction under Colo. R. Civ. P. III
(a) (3) was reversed with instructions to grant the injunction.
Kelley and his partner had individually contracted with Addresso-
graph not to compete with Addressograph for a period of one year
after termination of their respective contracts and within one hun-
dred miles of the office in which they might be employed at the
date of such termination. Immediately upon termination of their
employment Kelley and his co-defendant formed a partnership
87 The elements are: 1. an account which must have been examined and accepted by the parties;
2. an agreement that the balance and all items of account representing the previous monetary tran-
sactions of the parties are correct; 3. an admission of liability by the apparent debtor for the amount
of the balance against him; and 4. the assent of both parties and a meeting of the minds.
88 See 6 Corbin, Contracts 5 1308 (1962).
89 359 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1961).
90 Colo. Rev. Stat. 121.1-67 (1953).
91 362 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1961).
92 Colo. Rev. Stat. 73-1-2 (1953).
93 County Comm'r v. Flanagan, 21 Colo. App. 467, 122 Pac. 801 (1912).
94 362 P.2d 184 (Colo. 1961).
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dealing in identical equipment to that handled by Addressograph
and contacted persons whom they had previously contacted while
employees of Addressograph. The supreme court specifically found
that the restriction on competition, stated in full in the report, was
reasonable. The reader will remember that such restrictions are
generally enforceable only if justified by the circumstances sur-
rounding the particular contract and that reasonable limitations as
to both time and space should be stated to limit the scope of the
restrictive covenant.
In Seale v. Bates,95 the plaintiffs had entered into various con-
tracts with a corporate dance studio for several hundred hours of
dance instruction. The contracting studio assigned the contracts,
after full payment for the same had been made, and after partial
performance by the studio, to another corporate entity. The assignee
assumed the obligation to teach plaintiffs. Plaintiffs on being in-
formed of the assignment did not object to the same and proceeded
to take some lessons, two plaintiffs taking thirty one-half hour les-
sons and the other plaintiff taking twelve or thirteen hours of les-
sons. Plaintiffs then asserted a right to rescind and recover the very
substantial sums they had paid for the contracts because the as-
signee's ballroom was too small and overcrowded, and the instruc-
tion was not always given by one of the opposite sex. The original
contracts were silent as to these matters. Another ground for rescis-
sion was that the contract was a personal service contract and there-
fore not assignable without the consent of the students. The trial
court's finding that the students had consented to the assignment
was upheld. If this consent had not been present, the plaintiffs
would have succeeded in their action for rescission.9 6 The other
matters objected to by plaintiffs were not made conditions of the
assigned contracts and the court correctly refused to include such
conditions as being implied in the nature of the contract. 9T The case
cites, with approval, two sections of the Restatement of Contracts.9
In Lembke Plumbing & Heating v. Hayutin,99 Hayutin sued
Lembke for damages in tort, arising out of the negligent failure of
Lembke to properly install certain plumbing apparatus whereby
water escaped causing severe damage to Hayutin's home. A judg-
ment of $26,000 was obtained. Mr. Justice Frantz wrote the decision
making it clear that the action was based not upon contract but
upon tort, stating that even though the contract did not provide
for such damage, there is a common law obligation to exercise due
care, caution and skill resting on all persons and in all undertakings
when the rights of others are involved. Although this duty may not
be contractual, the law allows no vacuum; it imposes duty.)')
95 359 P.2d 356 (Colo. 1961).
96 See Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., 127 U.S. 379 (1888). Also see Restate-
ment, Contracts § 160(4) (1932).
97 This case does present helpful guideposts in advising a student concerning his rights against a
"school" should the school mistreat the student or otherwise materially fail to perform.
98 Restatement, Contracts § 160(4) supro note 96, and § 348 dealing with restitution.
99 366 P.2d 673 (Colo. 1961).
100 In arriving at this conclusion. Mr. Justice Frantz cited 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 20: "Accom.
panying every contract is a common low dut) to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and
faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions
is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract. In such a case, the contract is mere inducement creat-
ing the state of things which furnishes the occasion of the tort. In other words, the contract creates
the relation out of which grows the duty to use care." There may even be some indication through
the dicta in the citation to Hunter v. Quality Homes, 45 Del. 100, 68 A.2d 620 (1949), that this duty
to do the work with reasonable care and diligence, for the breach of which the law imposes a lia-
bility, runs not only to the contracting parties but also to a third person.
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